Governments often have the power to take property rights from private citizens but their responsibility to pay compensation is not typically well specified. In this paper we examine how the compensation rule adopted by a country affects both private investment decisions and takings decisions. We build on a widely accepted argument by Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro [3] that efficient investment will result if any lump sum compensation, including zero, is provided. This argument raises concern about the widely accepted practice of basing compensation on the market value of the taken property. Their results, however, hinge critically on the assumption that the government always takes actions that maximize social welfare. That is, they assume that governments (or policy makers) do not have their own agendas nor can be influenced by lobby groups or other organizations. In sharp contrast, we find that when this assumption is relaxed, the optimal compensation scheme must be related to, and in some cases is equal to, the market value of the taken property.
Introduction
Governments have the power to take property rights away from private citizens but their responsibility to pay compensation is typically not well specified. For example, the 5th amendment of the United States Constitution requires that "just compensation" be paid but guidelines for deciding how many dollars are needed to make compensation just are not provided. In other countries such as Canada and the U.K., compensation is not established in the constitution, allowing policy makers a great deal of discretion. While such discretion can be used to increase social welfare, it can, as the quote from Tullock [?] suggests, form the basis of a political moral hazard problem.
In this paper we examine the importance of this moral hazard problem to economically efficient compensation rules.
In practice, courts have shown a preference for using market value as the appropriate level of compensation. Many legal and economic commentators seem to generally support this preference.
For instance, Fischel and Shapiro [5] state "If pressed on the question, most economists and lawyers would, we believe, conclude that the government should pay for the property that it takes. The argument, especially that of economists, might be that forcing the government to pay for the resources it gets promotes efficiency." 1 In contrast to this view, the general conclusions of an influential paper by Blume, Rubinfeld and Shapiro [3] -henceforth BRS-are that (i) compensation at market value can lead to an investment inefficiency, and (ii) a lump sum payment will promote efficiency and, in some circumstances, any lump sum payment will do, including zero. The inefficiency that is created by market value compensation is the result of overinvestment due to a specific form of investment moral hazard.
The overinvestment problem can be best illustrated with a simple example. Consider an individual who wishes to build a house on a tract of land. There is a 50% chance that, at some future point in time, social welfare can be improved by the construction of a road through the property. If this happens, the house will have to be destroyed. If compensation for the expropriation is based on market value, then the individual will ignore the expropriation possibility in deciding how much to spend on the house: The individual's optimal investment level will equate private benefit to private cost independent of the probability of a loss. Since this ignores the social cost of destroying a valuable asset, an inefficiency results. On the other hand, if compensation is a lump sum that is independent of the amount spent, then expected private costs (the expected loss of the house) will reflect social costs and an efficient decision will be made.
The BRS noncompensation result-the result that zero compensation can promote economic efficiency-has had a significant impact both on the subsequent literature and on public policy. For instance, in the U.S. Fischel and Shapiro note that "the noncompensation result ... has become the focus of two law journal articles that advance it as the basis for a substantial reevaluation of the compensation practice in American law." In Canada, a commission of inquiry [?] has, based on the BRS argument, concluded ". . . that payment should be something less than the full reservation price (to avoid the moral hazard distortion). . ."
In this paper we show that the noncompensation result is critically linked to the assumptions that a) private investment has no social value if property rights are taken, and b) governments can precommit to only take property rights when it is socially beneficial to do so. We show that relaxing these assumptions leads to dramatically different compensation principles than the ones suggested by BRS.
Our work adds to recent contributions made by Fischel and Shapiro [?] and Hermalin [?] .
Fischel and Shapiro [?] consider a situation where the government's takings decision is determined by maximizing the welfare of the majority of voters. They conclude that the optimal compensation schedule will be some positive fraction of market value and show that this will not imlement the set of first best allocations. However, in deriving this result they restrict the form of the compensation schedule by ruling out lump sum payments.
2 When compensation is allowed to be a linear function-with a constant-of the market value, it can be shown 3 that the set of first best allocations is implementable and the form of the optimal compensation is a lump sum payment.
Clearly, this result mirrors that of BRS. Therefore, despite the considerable appeal of allowing nonbenevolent behavior on the part of the government, the argument made for the reliance on market values is not compelling.
Hermalin [?] also allows this form of non benevolent behavior on the part of the government by assuming that private property is only taken when the benefit to the majority of voters exceeds the taxes that would have to be levied to pay for the property. With these preferences the government ignores the private benefit of the taken property and, consequently may end up taking private property when it is not socially optimal to do so. Hermalin's [?] main result (Proposition 6) is similar to Proposition 1 in our paper. We go beyond this case, however, to also consider a government that will take private property only if it is beneficial for the owner of the private property, i.e., the case when business and government interests are closely aligned. There exists ample evidence which suggests that governments (or more specifically, politicians,) behave in this manner. 4 Here the results are very different. The optimal compensation scheme will take one of two very simple forms, depending on how likely it is that property will ultimately be taken. When the chance of property being taken is high, a lump sum compensation schedule is optimal. When the chance of property being taken is low, then the optimal scheme is to pay the market value of the property. Hence, we show that the conventional wisdom that has lead jurists to award market value as compensation is shown to be optimal under a set of what we feel are reasonable assumptions.
In the next section we set out our model which is similar to that analysed by BRS. The most important departure is in our assumptions concerning policy implementation. In BRS, the decision to take land follows a rigid rule: property rights are taken when social value exceeds private value.
As a result, in BRS the compensation rule affects only the behaviour of the investor. In contrast, we recognize that policy actions will be undertaken by a 'policy implementer' whose interests may or may not be the maximization of social welfare. That is, the policy implementer may choose actions that benefit only a segment of society even when the actions are not in best interest of the entire population. For example, consider the decision to remove rights to harvest timber so as to develop a wilderness park, where the right holder, the 'logger', has made an earlier investment in developing 4 See, for example, Stevie Cameron [?] who argues that, while former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was in office, a large number of government 'deals' took place that bestowed huge benefits on private sector individuals. Not surprisingly, the apparent beneficiaries of government largess were 'friends' of the government and of (Brain Mulroney's) Progressive Conservative party. (A number of these deals involved the purchase of land by the government). Although extremely large sums of monies were paid for projects, the actual social benefits associated with many were widely debated.
the timber stand. If the compensation rule specifies a zero payment, then a government that is closely tied to the 'campers' in society will view the taking as being costless and will completely ignore the potential lost output. In turn, anticipation of this may distort the ex ante private investment decision. Clearly, restrictions on compensation will affect both the investment decision and the taking decision. Thus, the compensation rule can be viewed as a tool that affects the behaviour of both the investor and policy implementer.
We interpret the compensation issue as a contract design problem between a principal-a benevolent social planner-and two agents-a firm who makes the investment decision and the government (or policy implementer) who determines when property rights are to be taken. The principal is viewed as imposing a compensation schedule-say, by enshrining it into the constitution-that subsequent governments must abide by.
In order to understand how compensation affects the behaviour of the investor and policy implementer, in Sections 3 and 4, we restrict the analysis to that of a single principal and single agent by assuming that either the policy implementer (in Section 3) or the firm (in Section 4) have preferences that coincide with those of the social planner. When the policy implementer's actions coincide with that of the social planner but the investor's actions do not, first best outcomes may be achieved by a lump sum compensation scheme. This is essentially the BRS result and it shows that lump sum compensation provides the appropriate incentives for ex ante investment decisions. When it is assumed that the firm's actions coincide with that of the social planner but the policy implementer's actions do not, first best outcomes can be achieved by a schedule that sets compensation equal to market value. This case illustrates that a market value compensation rule provides the correct incentives for the policy implementer's ex post takings decision.
Thus, when the agent making the ex ante decision (the investor) must be induced to act efficiently, compensation should be a lump sum but when the agent making the ex post decision (the implementer) must be induced to act efficiently, compensation should be based on market value. In Section 5 we assume that both the investor's and the policy implementer's preferences differ from the social planner's. We find that the optimal compensation schedule is never independent of the market value of land.
In Section 6 we conclude the paper with a summary of our results and an examination of policy implications. Jurists have shown a preference for using market value in determining optimal compensation. Ironically, recent economic arguments have been made against the use of market value and policy makers have used this as a basis for reconsidering compensation rules. Our main points are that (i) the use of market based rules is, in general, appropriate and (ii) a zero compensation rule is, in general, inappropriate.
Model
In our model a unit of capital is allocated to two technologies, one of which requires property rights to a public asset. Although property rights are typically associated with the ownership of land, other examples of relevant property rights abound. For instance, a license to use a technology that is known to generate a particular level of water or air pollution is a property right that can be revoked and replaced by new rights whenever environmental standards are changed. Once investments in technologies have been made, the social value of the public asset is revealed at which time, at the discretion of a policy implementer, the private property rights can be revoked. The problem that we examine is one of designing a rule that determines the level of compensation to be paid when the private property rights to the public asset are revoked.
The unit of capital is nonstorable and perfectly divisible. There exists two production technologies, θxτ and g(1 − x), which produce homogeneous output. The investment allocation is represented by x, the state of technology is θ and τ ∈ {0, 1}, where τ = 1 means that property rights have been retained and τ = 0 means that they have not. We assume that g > 0 and g < 0, and that g (y) → ∞ as y → 0. When property rights are revoked, i.e., τ = 0, both the investment and potential output from technology θxτ are lost. We will follow the literature in referring to the revocation of property rights as a taking. For ease of presentation, we will relate our model to the specific case of a tract of land that can be harvested to produce lumber by 'loggers' or, alternatively, can be turned into a public good, such as a park, to be enjoyed by 'campers'.
Production technology θxτ is risky in the sense that the property rights may be revoked and, if they are not, output is subject to technological uncertainty. Let θ > 0 be distributed according to the uniform density f (θ), where f (θ) > 0 ∀ θ ∈ [θ 0 , θ 1 ] and f(θ) = 0 otherwise. Production technology g(1 − x) can be viewed as being risk-free in that it does not require the use of revocable property rights and it is not subject to technological uncertainty. These latter assumptions are made only for convenience.
Initially, a logger owns both production technologies and the requisite property rights. When rights are taken from the logger they are given to campers who in total receive a benefit β. Let β be a random variable that is distributed according to the uniform density h(β), where h(β) ≥ 0 ∀ β ∈ [0, β 1 ] and h(β) = 0 otherwise. 5 Thus, we can represent the state of the world by the pair θ, β . Finally, we assume that β 1 > θ 1 ; this can be interpreted to mean that for every possible private value θx, there exists a social value that exceeds it.
When property rights are revoked, the government pays the logger C(θx). We assume that C(θx) can be precommitted to, in that once a schedule is established in law-say, by being enshrined in a constitution-it must be followed. We will sometimes refer to θx as the 'market value' of the land. Note that the compensation schedule is not a function of β. We believe that, although market values can be made verifiable to a court of law, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to verify social value. 6 Thus, one can interpret the compensation schedule, C(θx), as an incomplete contract.
The implementer's decision to take depends on the state of the world and is represented by We have assumed uniform probability density functions-f (θ) and h(β)-only in order to simplify the mathematical analysis. Our basic insights do not depend upon these assumptions. 6 In fact, we assume below that only the policy implementer can observe β.
takings decision is made and final output is realized, distributed and consumed.
The Logger
A single logger owns a firm whose assets are the technologies θxτ and g(y) as well as one unit of the investment good.
At date t 0 , before the state is revealed but after the compensation rule is in place, the logger selects the level of investments x ∈ [0, 1] and y = 1 − x in order to maximize her expected payoff,
where
The Camper
The representative camper does not make production or investment decisions. He receives the benefit of any taking decision and pays any user fees that are charged. The net expected payoff for
and v(θx) is the user fee. 
The Policy Implementer
The policy implementer is given the power to revoke the logger's property rights at t 1 . But, in doing so, he must abide by the compensation rule established at date t −1 by the social planner (who is described below). The rule requires that the implementer compensate the logger according to the schedule C(θx) when land is taken and that sufficient user fees be charged to avoid a deficit. 8 Since the policy implementer acts after investments have been made and the state of the world is known, he will base his taking decision on the ex post payoffs to the logger and camper.
The specification of the implementer's objective function reflects the extent to which the implementer's action is influenced by votes, his own beliefs, political action committees, bribes, etc.
9
The implementer's objective function will be to maximize
subject to the budget constraint
where ω ∈ [0, 1] is a weight that reflects the importance of the two 'constituencies' to the policy implementer. It may be the case that the implementer is indifferent between taking and retaining property rights. In this circumstance, we will assume that the implementer will select that action which maximizes social welfare. 10 Since v(θx) = C(θx), we will compactly represent the
When ω = .5, the implementer said to be 'benevolent' because his objectives are in line with those of the social planner, (discussed below). In addition to ω = .5, we consider the cases where ω = 0-i.e., the implementer 'cares' only about campers-and where ω = 1-i.e., the implementer 'cares' only about the loggers.
The Social Planner
At date t −1 the social planner establishes a rule, C(θx), governing the taking of land at date t 1 .
The planner is equally concerned about each agent in the economy and we assume that there is one logger and one camper. The planner's problem can be viewed as a single principal, two agent problem, where the agents are the logger and the 'ω-type' policy implementer. Formally, the 8 Any payment given to the logger must somehow be financed. The only other agent in the model who can finance it is the camper. Since our model is essential static, i.e., there is only one consumption period, it must be the case that C(θx) = v(θx).
9 For an excellent survey and application of this approach see Grossman and Helpman [6] . See also, Laffont and Tirole ( [7] , Part V). 10 In the event that a social planner, whose objective is to maximize social welfare, is indifferent between taking and not taking, we make the tie-breaking assumption that property rights are not taken.
planner's problem is,
We define W (x, C(θx), {τ (θ, β)}) to be the social welfare function and it is this which the planner seeks to maximize. The constraints (IC l ) and (IC ω ) represent the incentive constraints for the logger and the implementer, respectively. We will refer to (SW ), (IC l ), (IC ω ) as the constrained planner's problem. For simplicity, we will restrict our attention to linear compensation schedules,
i.e., C(θx) = a + bθx.
The Policy Implementer is Benevolent
In this section we consider the case where the implementer's and the social planner's preferences coincide, i.e., ω = .5. We show that it is possible to implement the first best allocation through a (lump sum) compensation schedule when the social value of the public asset is independent of the level of private investment x. 11 We start with the characterization of the set of first best allocations.
First Best Characterization
Before proceeding, we characterize the first best outcome by solving the unconstrained planning The planner will choose x and m so as to maximize the social welfare function, The first order conditions to the planner's problem can be simplified to,
and
Condition (2) defines the set of states where, for a given x, the social benefit of the land equals the market value of the land. The first order condition (1) is diagrammatically depicted in Figure 1 .
For an arbitrary level of investmentx, the x-axis represents the possible market values of output for the risky technology and the y-axis represents the social value of land. The first order condition (1) is given by the (45 o ) line β = θx. For all outcomes above the 45 o line it is socially optimal to take property away from the logger and for all outcomes below the 45 o line it is socially optimal not to take the rights away. Finally, note that as the level of investment x increases, the (ex ante) probability of a taking,
Condition (3) ER(x) is increasing and strictly convex in x; (ii) ES(x) is decreasing and strictly concave in x; (iii)
is increasing strictly convex in x; and (iv) and there exists a strictly concave func-
and ER(x) +g(1−x) are strictly concave in x. 12 For the purposes of our analysis we will assume that both ER(
x)+ES(x) and ER(x)+ES(x)+g(1−x)
are strictly concave for all x, unless otherwise specified. The three components of the planner's objective function, their sums and the optimal level of investment, x * , are represented in Figure 2a and 2b.
The BRS Results
In this section we show that, with the appropriate restrictions, our model delivers the BRS results.
The Non-compensation Result
In order to obtain the non-compensation result, we restrict our model in the following manner.
A1: h(β) > 0 for β ∈ {0, β 1 }; otherwise h(β) = 0. Assumption A1 implies that the level of investment, x, does not affect the takings decision: if β = 0, then, for any x > 0, it is never optimal to take and if β = β 1 , then it is always optimal to take, (recall that we have assumed that β 1 > θ 1 ). 13 Our assumption that the implementer is benevolent implies that the constraint (IC ω=.5 ) in the constrained planner's problem can be ignored since the planner and the implementer will always follow the same taking policy. 13 Instead of using a two state distribution for β, BRS obtain the non-compensation result by assuming that the planner can precommit the implementer to take only in certain states. This makes the taking decision independent of the level of investment. Given that (i) the logger will be compensated C(θx) = a + bθx when there is a taking and (ii) a taking will occur only in state β 1 , the logger's optimal level of investment is given by, arg max
Thus, the optimal level of investment is given by the solution to the following (first order) condition,
Given that the logger will behave according to (IC l ), what is the optimal compensation schedule that the planner should design? The planner will solve problem (SW ), (IC l ) , or more specifically, will choose a, b and x to solve,
subject to constraint (IC l ). The first order condition (with respect to b) for this problem is given by λh(β 1 )
where λ represents the multiplier associated with constraint (IC l ). Since
implies that λ = 0, i.e., the compensation schedule must be designed so that constraint (IC l )
does not bind. If constraint (IC l ) does not bind, then the solution to the unconstrained planner's problem (SW ) is given by
i.e., the first best level of investment. The only way that (IC l ) will not bind in the maximization problem (SW ), (IC l ) is if equations (5) and (IC l ) are simultaneously satisfied. By inspection, this occurs only when b = 0: the optimal compensation schedule is given by C(θx) = a. Therefore, by setting the level of compensation equal to some constant level of payment, including zero, the first best allocation can be achieved.
BRS point out that 'overinvestment' will results if there is full compensation, i.e., if C(θx) = θx.
Since with full compensation the logger will receive θx whether or not the land is taken, the logger's optimal level of investment is given by arg max
or by the solution to
The 'x' that solves (6) is greater than the 'x' that solves (5).
The BRS non-compensation result is diagrammatically depicted in Figures 3a and 3b . Figure 3a depicts the unconstrained planner's problem. Note that since the (ex ante) probability of a taking is independent of the level investment, x, the planner's objective function is strictly concave for any Figure 3b depicts the logger's problem for when (1) compensation is zero and (2) compensation is market value. When the compensation is set equal to zero, the logger's maximum payoff is achieved at the socially optimal level of investment. Clearly, any constant level of compensation will result in the logger choosing a level of investment equal to x * . Finally, note that if compensation is (positively) linked to market value, i.e., 0 < b ≤ 1, there will be overinvestment. This is shown in Figure 3b , for the case b = 1, where the level of investment undertaken by the logger isx > x * .
Positive Compensation
In this section we show that, in general, noncompensation is not optimal. To do this we no longer assume a two point distribution on β, i.e., we no longer assume that A1 holds, but continue to assume that the implementer's preferences are consistent with the planner's.
Since we now assume that h(β) > 0 ∀ β ∈ [0, β 1 ], it is possible for the logger to affect the takings decision of the implementer by altering the amount invested in each technology. Define a differentiable function n:
. The function n plays a similar role to the function m in the previous section.
Given that the compensation schedule that the logger faces is C(θx) = a + bθx, her optimal level of investment is, arg max Figure 3 : The BRS Resultswhich is also given by the solution to
The social planner will choose the compensation schedule that is given by the solution to
subject to constraint (IC l ). The first order conditions with respect to a and b to this problem are,
where λ is the multiplier associated with constraint (IC l ). Conditions (7) and (8) imply that λ = 0, i.e., the optimal compensation scheme implies that constraint (IC l ) in the planner's problem does not bind. If constraint (IC l ) does not bind, then the solution to the unconstrained planner's problem, (SW ) , is given by
Note that equations (9) and (10) correspond to equation (2) and (3), respectively. Equations (10) and (IC l ) can simultaneously be satisfied-implying that (IC l ) does not bind in the maximization problem-if b = 0 and
where x * is the first best level of investment. Therefore, a constant payment compensation schedule can implement the set of first best allocations. However, unlike the result of the previous section, the constant payment can not be arbitrary. 
It is straight forward to demonstrate that:
e., the expected marginal return to the logger for investing in the risky technology is reduced as a increases; and 15 This implies that by choosing an 'appropriate' level of a, it is possible to have the loggers payoff-ER(x) + EC(x|a > 0, b = 0) + g(1 − x)-achieve a maximum at x = x * . This is depicted in Figure 4 .
We summarize the findings of Section 3.2 in the following proposition, 
Proposition 0. When the policy implementer's objective is to maximize social welfare, it is always possible to implement the set of first best allocations by having a lump sum compensation rule.
Remark 1: In the case where the level of investment affects the takings decision, there are many different compensation schemes that can implement the first best. For example, a compensation schedule that sets b = 1 and
will implement the first best, i.e., compensation depends upon observed market value. 16 BRS demonstrate that it is possible to implement the set of first best allocations by using a compensation rule that depends on 'profits', θx −x. However, the important point in our view is that if the policy implementer has the same preferences as the social planner, then it is possible to implement the first best with a compensation schedule that is independent of observed market value.
Remark 2: Implicit in Proposition 0 is the assumption that the social welfare function and the entrepreneur's (zero compensation) payoff function are strictly concave for all x. Suppose that this is not the case. For example, for the model parameters specified in footnote 9, if A=1, then the social welfare function will be concave for all x > .5 and will be convex for all x < .5. Consider the payoff functions that are depicted in Figure 5 . The important feature of this diagram is that the logger's zero compensation payoff function is convex at x * . Consider now a compensation scheme that specifies b = 0 and a is given by equation (11). Although the first order condition from the logger's problem will identify a critical point at x = x * , this critical point is a local minimum. In this case, a lump sum payment will be unable to implement the first best level of investment. In order to implement the first best outcome, it must be the case that compensation be a function of market value, i.e., b > 0. 
Investment Affects Social Value of Public Asset
In this section we depart from the assumption that the social value of the public asset is independent of the level of private investment x. It is not difficult to think of examples where the level of private 16 Note that an increase in b, holding a constant, gives the logger an incentive to overinvest. To counteract this incentive, if b is increased, a must also be increased if the level of investment is to remain at x * . Therefore, the least cost compensation, which gives the logger an incentive to invest x * , is one that sets b = 0. value. Thus, the BRS results break down. In order to make our point we will consider a variation of the model presented in Section 3.2.1, i.e., the case where the implementer is benevolent and β comes from a two point distribution.
We now denote the social value of the public asset as γ(β, x), where the social value depends upon both the 'state' of the public asset, β, and the level of private investment, x. Private investment is 'beneficial' to the social value of the public asset if γ x > 0 and it is not when γ x < 0. We will restrict the model in the following manner,
This assumption is a modified version of Assumption A1, above, where it is modified to take account of the affect that private investment has on social values. 18 We begin by characterizing the first best allocation for this economy. The first best level of investment is that x which maximizes social welfare, i.e.,
The first order condition to this problem is given by
Note that the 'extra' term h(β 1 )γ x (β 1 , x) in this equation, compared to equation (4), reflects the effect that private investment has on social values.
Given that a taking will occur only when the state of the public asset is β 1 and that the logger will be compensated a + bθx in the event of a taking, the optimal level of investment-which is the same condition given in Section 3.2.1-is given by the solution to
In designing the optimal compensation schedule, the social planner solves (Ŝ W ) subject to constraint (IC l ). The first order condition for this problem (with respect to b)-which is the same as the condition that is given in Section 3.2.1-is
where λ represents the multiplier associated with constraint (4 ). The implication of this condition is that λ = 0, i.e., the compensation schedule must be designed so that constraint (IC l ) does not bind. Constraint (IC l ) will not bind if equations (4 ) and (IC l ) are simultaneously satisfied and this occurs only when
Therefore, the optimal compensation schedule is given by C(θx) = a +bθx, where a can take on any value.
This result illustrates the fragility of the argument that compensation should be independent of market value. Even when the implementer is benevolent, compensation should be based on market value whenever the the social value of the taken property is affected by private investment.
The Logger is Benevolent
In this section we show that when the logger is benevolent and the implementer is not, the set of first best allocations can be achieved through a compensation schedule based on market value. We define a benevolent logger as one who selects her investment so as to maximize social welfare. A non-benevolent implementer is one who is only concerned with the camper's welfare, i.e., ω = 0, or the logger's welfare, i.e., ω = 1. Given these assumptions, the planner's problem is given by (SW )(IC ω ) . Note that for the remainder of the paper we will assume that the social value of the public asset is given by β and is independent of level of private investment x.
Assume that the implementer cares only about the camper's welfare, i.e., ω = 0. He will take land only when β > a + bθx. The planner's problem can be compactly represented by, max {a,b,x}
Note that constraint (IC ω=0 ) is embedded in (12). The first order conditions to this problem are,
Note that a = 0 and b = 1 solve equations (13) and (14). When a = 0 and b = 1 are substituted into (15) and rearranged, we obtain, which is identical to the conditions for the planner's unconstrained problem, i.e., conditions (2) and (3). Therefore, by requiring the implementer to pay market value for the land that is taken, the set of first best allocations can be achieved.
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 6 . Consider a compensation scheduleĈ = a + bθx, where a > 0 and 0 < b < 1. Note that the takings action of the policy implementer will be ex post socially inefficient in regions A and B. In region A, although it is socially optimal to take-since the market value of the risky output, θx * , is less than the social value, β-a policy implementer who cares only about camper's welfare will not take because the net benefit of the taking for the camper, β −Ĉ, is negative. Similarly, in region B, although it is socially optimal not to take, the policy implementer will take since the net payoff to the camper will be positive if the property rights are taken. By setting a = 0 and b = 1-implying that the compensation schedule corresponds to the line β = θx * -the social planner can induce the policy implementer to undertake the 'correct' ex post takings decision.
It is not difficult to demonstrate that if ω = 1, i.e., the implementer cares only about the logger's welfare, then the first best is achievable by requiring the implementer to pay market value for any land taken.
In order to elicit socially optimal behaviour from the implementer, the planner should offer a compensation schedule that is equal to market value. Such a schedule-which does not depend upon the the preferences of the implementer-will cause the implementer to take land only if the social value of land is greater than the private value.
In summary, the two behavioural constraints that are important to the planner's problem are the 'ex ante constraint' which reflects investment decision of the logger, (IC l ), and the 'ex post constraint' which reflects the takings decision of the implementer, (IC ω ). Up to this point we have artificially restricted the planner's problem so that at most only one of these constraints bind. In general, however, the social planner will have to balance both ex ante and ex post incentives. We now examine this issue.
Second Best Implementation
We now examine the optimal compensation schedule when incentive constraints (IC l ) and (IC ω ) both bind, i.e., when the planner's problem is given by (SW ), (IC l ), (IC ω ) .
The Policy Implementer Cares only about the Camper's Welfare
In this section we assume that ω = 0. Given the objective of the implementer, the logger's optimal level of investment is arg max
or, alternatively, is given by the solution to,
The constrained planner's problem is given by max {a,b,x}
(which is the same as (12) above) subject to constraint (17). The first order conditions to the constrained planner's problem are,
where λ is the multiplier associated with constraint (17). The following proposition demonstrates that compensation will not be independent of market value.
Proposition 1 When the policy implementer only cares about the camper's welfare, the optimal
compensation schedule will depend upon the market value, i.e., b = 0.
Proof: Assume the contrary, i.e., that b = 0. Equation (17) becomes,
and equation (20) becomes
Equations (21) and (22) 
But E(θ 2 ) = (E(θ)) 2 , a contradiction. Therefore, it can not be that b = 0. 2
The implication of Proposition 1 is that market value is an important tool in aligning the interests of the logger and implementer with that of the social planner. The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that, when the implementer is concerned only with the welfare of the camper, he must be induced to internalize the cost of foregone output, θx, and this can only be achieved by making the compensation schedule depend upon θx. To see this, suppose that b is set to zero and a > 0. In this case, the implementer will take whenever β > a, independent of the value of lost output. But an efficient taking decision requires a comparison of θx with β. When b = 0, the implementer's decision will reflect a measure of foregone output via the compensation schedule and, thus, 'improves' the takings decision. It is straight forward to demonstrate that a = 0 and b = 1 is also not an optimal compensation scheme: although the takings decisions will be ex post efficient, the cost of eliciting this behaviour is overinvestment. The optimal compensation scheme will have a ≥ 0 and 0 < b < 1. Thus having a > 0 and b < 1: (i) improves the 'overinvestment problem' compared to a compensation scheme that specifies a = 0 and b = 1 and (ii) improves the ex post takings decision compared to a compensation scheme that specifies a > 0 and b = 0.
The Policy Implementer Cares only about the Logger's Welfare
The case where the policy implementer cares only about the logger's welfare is in a sense 'qualitatively different' from the previous case. The preferences of the implementer now implies that he is not inherently interested in β. However, unlike above, where it was possible to get the implementer to consider forgone output in his takings decision (when he inherently was not interested in the market value of output), it is not possible to get the implementer to consider the ex post social value of the public asset, β, because β is not contractible. As a result, in order to induce 'appropriate' takings behaviour, the compensation schedule will be designed so that on average the takings decision will be correct. We now examine this case.
When the implementer cares only about the logger's welfare and the compensation schedule is a + bθx, the logger's optimal level of investment is arg max
or, alternatively, is given by the solution to, 
subject to (23). The first order conditions (with respect to a and b) are,
where λ is the multiplier associated with constraint (23). Equation (25) sf (s)ds > 0, it must be the case that λ = 0. If we solve the 'unconstrained' planner's problem (24) , then the optimal level of investment is the solution to,
For convenience we denote the implicit lower limit of integration in (27) asθ and the solution to equation (27) asx(θ). Equations (27) and (23) will be equal to one another-and, thus, constraint 
th(t)dt.
Since the implementer cares about the logger's welfare, any takings decisions will reflect the value of foregone output. Although any compensation rule is unable to get the implementer to consider the ex post social value of the public asset when making his taking decision, setting a = E(β) can be interpretted as getting the implementer to make the correct takings decision on average.
Note that when the optimal schedule is C(θx) = E(β), it must be that E(β) > θ 0x (θ). 19 What will be the optimal schedule if it turns out thatx(θ 0 )θ 0 = E(β)? If we set the compensation schedule so that a = E(β) and b = 0, then (i) the probability that a taking occurs is zero and (ii) the level of investment,x(θ 0 ), is the solution to
If, instead, we consider a compensation schedule that sets a = 0 and b = 1, the level of investment is (also) given by the solution to equation (28) but now ex post takings decisions are always efficient.
Therefore, we may conclude that whenever E(β) ≤ θ 0x (θ 0 ), the optimal compensation schedule is given by a = 0 and b = 1 and whenever E(β) > θ 0x (θ 0 ), then the optimal compensation schedule is given by a = E(β) and b = 0.
The above analysis indicates that there is a clear tradeoff between efficient takings decisions and efficient investment. When the expected social value of the public asset is greater than the 'minimum' market value of output, θ 0x (θ 0 ), then it is better to get the takings decision correct only on average in order to induce a more efficient level of investment. When the average social value of the public asset is sufficiently low, i.e., lower than θ 0x (θ 0 ), it is better to accept a more inefficient level of private investment, in return for ex post efficient takings decisions. We may summarize the analysis and discussion contained in Section 5.2 in the following proposition,
Proposition 2 If the policy implementer cares only about the logger's welfare, then if E(β) >
x(θ 0 ), the optimal compensation schedule will be a lump sum equal to E(β) and if E(β) ≤ θ 0x (θ 0 ), the optimal compensation schedule will be equal to market value.
Remark 3:
At an intuitive level, one can interpret Proposition 2 as follows. Compare the expected social value, E(β), with the 'lowest market value', (assuming that compensation is E(β)). If the former is strictly greater than the latter, then give a lump sum compensation equal to E(β) and if the former is less than the latter, then give market value compensation. Hence, both the minimum and realized market value plays a role in the optimal compensation. The minimum market value 19 To see this, recall that we have assumed that is used to decide whether or not realized market value will be incorporated in the compensation schedule.
Discussion and Summary
The BRS study presents an elegant and compelling case for a simple, efficient compensation rule.
We have shown that the introduction of political influence greatly complicates the appropriate compensation rule. When the policy implementer is benevolent, market value can be ignored (in some circumstances). But once implementer is allowed to have a preference for one group in society over another, then market value will generally be important.
On the one hand, the sensitivity of the compensation rule to political influence suggests that it is dangerous to leave the compensation rule up to the implementer. We show how welfare is improved by precommitting the implementer to a rule that forces recognition of factors he would rather ignore.
On the other hand, however, our analysis indicates how difficult the task actually is of presepcifying a compensation rule. We have shown that it is only under very specific circumstances that the simple rule proposed by BRS will be efficient: the implementer must be benevolent and private investment can not effect either the probability of a taking or the social value of the property right.
We have also shown that when these conditions do not hold, market value will be important in many cases. However, the specific link between market value and compensation is not simple as it depends on the social value of private investment, the specific form of the production functions, the the nature of technological uncertainty, and the preferences of the implementer. Enshrining rules with this level of detail for all possible future takings decisions is a daunting task.
As a practical matter, it is the preferences of the implementer that cause the greatest difficulty.
We have assumed that the social planner knows the preferences that will be effective in the future.
When this is not the case, then the planner faces a more difficult mechanism design problem. Now the compensation schedule will not only have to deal with investment and implementation but will, in addition, have to induce implementers to reveal their preferences.
Conclusion
In this study we consider the role of compensation rules in both private investment decisions and policy implementation decisions. The novel feature of our analysis is an allowance of politically motivated implementation where the political influence can come from private investors as well as the majority of voters. The main result of our investigation is the discovery that optimal compensation varies with the source of the influence and with the probability that property rights will be taken. In contrast to the earlier literature but in line with more recent contributions, we show that in most cases an efficient compensation schedule must reflect market value to some extent. In particular cases, however, the widely held prescription that exactly market value should be paid as compensation is found to be optimal.
The importance of market value derives from two sources. First, we show that even when the political motivations of the implementer are not important, market value based compensation is efficient when private investment affects the social value of property rights that are taken. Interestingly, the relationship between market value and compensation can be positive or negative:
Our rule is to reward investment that is socially beneficial and penalize investment that is socially harmful.
Next we focus on the cases where policy implementers are not benevolent in that they are more concerned with the welfare of one group in society than of another. In many circumstances, market value is an essential element of an efficient scheme. We have rigorously demonstrated what is, we feel, intuitively obvious: Requiring decision makers to pay market value forces them to internalize economic costs that their political concerns would cause them to ignore.
Our main policy recommendation is that market value based compensation should not be abandoned. Further study of more complex and realistic implementation problems is needed in order to form more specific policy recommendations. We suspect, however, that our main policy recommendation is robust to these more complex specifications.
